"The Mouse that Roared" by Adelman, Howard
The Mouse That Roared 
A government study shows that new legislation which has been opposed so strongly 
and for so long by the refugee'support community and has been pushed just as stub- 
bornly and uncompromisingly by the government,will, in fact, have little impact on 
reducing the number of refugee claims. The return to a safe third country will affect, 
at the most optimistic estimate, 10 percent of claimants and, likely, far fewer. Further, 
the numbers of claimants would probably have been reduced by twice as much if leg- 
islative measures had been introduced which had the support of most refugee sup- 
port groups. 
The "Safe Country" 
Concept 
New legislation passed recently (Bills 
C-33 and C-84) was intended to reduce 
spontaneous arrivals into Canada who 
claim refugee s ta tus  by enabling 
Canadian immigration officers to return 
many such claimants without a refugee 
hearing. A key concept in the new legisla- 
tion is "safe country". The "safe country" 
provision is intended to keep out of the 
Canadian refugee claims system: 1) those 
who have received refugee status in 
another country; 2) those who have 
applied for refugee status in another 
country; and, most importantly, 3) those 
who could have applied for refugee status 
in another country. These requirements 
have been qualified by Ministerial assur- 
ances: the concept of a safe country would 
only be applied where a first country did 
not exhibit a pattern of discrimination 
against certain classes of refugee 
claimants who, if they had claimed 
refugee status in Canada, wouid have a 
reasonable possibility of being successful. 
Thus, the United States, which has an 
extremely low rate of acceptance for 
Salvadoreans and Guatemalans, in com- 
parison to acceptance rates in Canada, 
would not be considered a safe country 
with respect to a specific class of 
claimants - Salvadoreans and 
Guatemalans. 
The Issues 
There are a number of issues that 
have arisen with respect to the concept of 
a "safe country." What does the concept 
mean? Is it a valid principle in terms of 
the political theory and premises of a lib- 
eral state? Is such a concept legally valid 
given the constitution of Canada? Finally, 
what is the effect of such a concept in 
deterring pseudo-refugees and genuine 
refugees from claiming refugee status in 
Canada? 
The Meaning of 
"Safe Country" 
"Safe country" means, at the very 
least, a country which has signed the 
Geneva Convention and agrees not to 
refoule refugees who arrive in their coun- 
try to establish that they are refugees 
according to the Convention. At one 
level, a safe country is any country in the 
world which has agreed in law to accord 
protection to refugee claimants. 
But the legal requirement is not suffi- 
cient. The practice of that law must be 
taken into account. I f  the  American 
refugee acceptance rate for Guatemalans 
and Salvadoreans is extremely low, as 
indicated earlier, and is much higher in 
Canada, then, in spite of the law, the U.S. 
is not a "safe country" for Guatemalans 
and Salvadoreans. Law and application 
of the l aw must both be taken into 
account. 
A third and more difficult issue is the 
quality of the protection and whether it is 
equivalent to Canada's. West Germany, 
for example, may not be able to deter 
refugee claimants by use of a "safe coun- 
try" designation since most arrivals in 
West Germany d o  not come via other 
countries which have signed the Geneva 
Convention. They very often come from 
East Germany via Berlin. But West 
Germany has a constitutional provision 
requiring the admission of refugee 
claimants from East Germany. One way 
of deterring refugee claimants may be to 
require them to live in camps for several 
years, ostensibly to learn German and 
become acculturated. Until then, such 
refugee claimants may not be given an 
opportunity to work or pursue their edu- 
cation. 
The quality of protection, as narrowly 
defined, is equivalent to that in Canada; 
refugee claimants are not being returned 
to the countries where they claimed they 
were persecuted. But the status of refugee 
claimants is not equivalent; in this broader 
sense, the quality of protection is n o t  
equivalent. Those who advocated the 
"safe country" doctrine tended to define 
refugee protection narrowly. 
The Principle of a 
"Safe Country" 
ls "safe country" a valid principle? 
fo answer this question it is necessary to 
ascertain the principle behind the obliga- 
tion of a country to accept refugees. In 
summary (see my article in the Journal of 
Refuge Studies, Vol. 1, NO. 1, for a more 
detailed discussion) the principle States 
that when the whole world is divided into 
nation-states, and a primary obligation of 
a nation-state is to provide protection for 
its citizens, when any one of those nation- 
states fails to fulfill that obligation, the 
other nation-states have an obligation to 
that protection to victims of that 
failure who land within the jurisdiction of 
a state which does protect its citizens. The 
principle is silent as to whether an indi- 
vidual who lacks protection can pick and 
choose amongst the states which offer 
protection based on the quality of the pro- 
tection accorded them a s  refugee 
claimants. 
However, it would seem contrary to 
the fundamental principle of the obliga- 
tion of the nation-state to accord protec- 
tion for refugee claimants to choose 
amongst the protective states on the basis 
of which one provides the best opportuni- 
tics once given that protection. Such a 
principle of choice for the refugee would 
result in refugee claimants shopping 
around; the country that afforded the best 
conditions for renewing their lives would 
attract the greatest number of refugee 
claimants. This would, in effect, discour- 
age countries from providing good oppor- 
tunities, since the better the opportunities 
the more refugee claimants they would 
attract. 
On the other hand, one of the premis- 
es behind the obligation to refugees is the 
rights of an individual. Every individual 
should have the right to leave his or her 
country. Every individual should have 
the right to choose where to live. But, and 
this is a very important but, the right to 
choose where one should live is subject to 
the qualification of the right of any state 
On behalf of its citizens to control entry 
into its domain. 
Thus, even on liberal premises, a 
" b e e  claimant does not have the right 
wdtoo* a country of asylum and to shop 
for the country in which to apply 
for protection. The premises of the 
&gee Proteaion system is based on cir- 
cumstances, not choice. The country in 
which refugees find themselves cannot 
refoule them and has an obligation to pro- 
tect them. Further, the implication of 
allowing that refugee choice may be that 
countries are encouraged to lower the 
quality of protection to discourage sponta- 
neous arrivals; if this is the case, the prin- 
ciple of choice is counterproductive to 
ensuring a high level of protection. 
If, however, the premise of refugee 
protection is based on circumstances, 
those circumstances will result in some 
countries receiving a very large propor- 
tion of refugee claimants because of the 
geographical and historical circumstances 
of that country. In order to offset circum- 
stances, that country might lower the 
quality of protection in order to pressure 
refugee claimants to move onto other 
countries to claim refugee status. 
The result is that the very principles 
and rules set up to guarantee protection 
for refugee claimants end up acting as a 
mechanism to lower the quality of protec- 
tion. 
The Legality of a 
"Safe-Country" Provision 
There are a number of questions 
which have been raised about whether 
denying a potential refugee claimant 
access to Canada's refugee claims proce- 
dure is constitutional on the basis that 
they could have made a refugee claim in 
another country. The effcct of the new 
Canadian law is to require a claimant to 
make a claim in any country which he or 
she sojourned. (Sojourning is defined by 
the CElC study as entering that country 
and passing through its passport controls 
and staying more than two days.) The 
effect of the law is to treat two individuals 
differently on the basis of what one might 
or could or should have done elsewhere. 
The individuals did not commit a criminal 
act in so doing. They did not fail to com- 
ply with any positive Canadian require- 
ments for entry into Canada - obtaining a 
visa, having certain medical inoculations, 
etc. A number of constitutional experts 
argue that, according to the Canadian 
constitution (and cascs that already have 
been judged in accordance with that con- 
stitution), this form of discrimination will 
be found to be unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Whether this 
will in fact take place must await a chal- 
lenge to the new Canadian law. 
The Purpose of a 
"Safe Countrytt Provision 
In the publicity and speeches of 
Ministers responsible for introducing the 
new Canadian legislation, the purported 
purpose was to keep manifestly unfound- 
ed refugee claimants from clogging up the 
Canadian refugee claims system. 
Manifestly unfounded claims are not 
equivalent to claimants who fail to prove 
the validity of their claims to qualify for 
refugee status. Of the unproven claims, 
manifestly unfounded claims are only a 
portion. Claimants who come from coun- 
tries with none or very few successful 
refugee claims make up the overwhelm- 
ing bulk of manifestly unfounded cases. 
A recent s tudy of the  Refugee 
Determination Task Force of Employment 
and Immigration Canada, Refugee 
Claimants: Analysis of Current Flows to 
Canada (March 19881, provides documen- 
tation to indicate that the new Canadian 
refugee legislation was not aimed primari- 
ly at pseudo-claimants, as was publicly 
claimed, but at claimants from refugee 
producing countries who were shopping 
around for countries which either had a 
more liberal claims procedure or which 
offered a higher level of protection. This 
was the point of the "safe return" provi- 
sion. And the study explicitly admits this. 
The concept of safe return is based on thc prin- 
aple that Canada is not the only country in the 
world which accords protection to refugee 
claimants. ... It recognizes that many refugm 
applicants have sought - or could have sought - first asylum in one or more foreign countries 
where the quality of protection afforded is 
equivalent to that offered by Canada. (p. 3) 
The statistical results of the study 
reinforce this position. If one eliminates 
the cases with no indication of refugee 
acceptance rates and divides the balance 
of cases surveyed (1209) into those who 
come from refugee producing countries 
with acceptance rates over 50 percent 
(manifestly foundcd claims), those who 
come from refugee producing countries 
with acceptance rates under 15 percent 
(manifestly unfounded claims) and place 
the balance in a sundry column in which 
the character of the claims is not manifcst, 
only 19 percent of thc claims can be classi- 
fied as manifestly unfounded; 55 pcrccnt 
are manifestly well-founded claims, 
though, since not all are accepted, not all 
well-founded claims are successful (see 
Refugee Claimants: Table 1). 
Continued on page 6 
Refugee Claimants 1 
Table 1 
Manifestly Manifestly Non-Manifes tly Totals 
Unfounded Claims Founded Claims Known Claims 
Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % 
225 19 667 55 312 26 1209 100 
The statements of the study and the 
statistics demonstrate clearly that the "safe 
return" provision of the new legislation 
was not primarily aimed at eliminating 
bogus refugee claimants from the system 
but at refugee claimants who could have 
made a claim in another country. 
Individuals from the refugee support com- 
munity attending a consultation session 
with government officials and members of 
parliament almost two years ago arrived 
at a consensus (the Hawkes model) on 
how to deter bogus claimants without any 
of the draconian measures of the new leg- 
islation. If the target had only been 
unwarranted claimants, the compromise 
adopted would have provided the basis 
for the new legislation. 
The Effectiveness of the 
"Saf eCountryW Provision 
The intention of the CEIC study was 
not, of course, to prove that government 
propaganda about the purpose of the 
recent legislation was false, but to provide 
evidence justifying its legislation. The 
study concludes, 
It is clear that the concept of "safe return" could 
affect up to 40% of claimant arrivals, depending 
upon the range of countries that meet the 
requirements to be designated as safe for the 
return of asylum seekers. As a result, it is likely 
that the "safe return" mechanism will have a 
substantial impact in controlling the irregular 
movement of asylum seekers to Canada. (p. 2) 
Does the study in fact establish any  
such thing? To answer the question it is 
necessary to accept the statistics as pub- 
lished and to ignore some dis:ortions, 
such as the fact that the sample ncludes 
not only refugee claimants, but any person 
arriving from one of Canada's top ten 
refugee-claimant source countries even if 
such individuals did not claim and did 
not intend to claim refugee status. The 
study could have published the statistics 
on the number of individuals coming from 
refugee-claimant source countries who 
expressed no intention of claiming refugee 
status in Canada. But it did not. 
Though we must use these statistics 
with this major assumption, one can note 
that the effect of this methodological 
assumption will be first, to inflate the pro- 
portion of refugee claimants who arrive 
with proper documentation (and there- 
fore, who can be sent back to other coun- 
tries), since, presumably, 100 percent of 
arrivals not intending to claim refugee 
status carry proper documentation and, 
second, to distort the statistics that define 
direct and indirect arrivals and sojourners 
as a proportion of actual refugee 
claimants. 
Ignore the distortions. The central 
question is whether the statistics provide 
evidence that the legislation on "safe 
country" return is efficacious. The con- 
cept of a "safe country" return is the main 
instrument for keeping refugee claimants 
out  of the refugee claims process in 
Canada. Ignore the other issues such as 
the legality and justice of denying entry to 
the refugee claims process for claimants 
from refugee producing countries. 
To determine whether legislation is 
efficacious, it is not sufficient to determine 
the maximum percentage of cases (the 
study estimates 40 percent) which will be 
impacted by the safe country provision. It 
also requires determining which cases can 
be deterred without any legislation what- 
soever and which cases could have been 
deterred by other, milder legislation 
which is acceptable to most parts of the 
refugee support community as well as the 
oppos~tion parties. Indeed, m~:der legisla- 
tion could have been passed almost two 
years ago, probably with all party sup- 
port, and made a major impact on the 
backlog of cases. Finally, what percentage 
of cases cannot be deterred because the 
refugee claimants are undocumented? 
What percentage of cases cannot be 
deterred because the refugee claimants 
arrived in Canada without sojourning 
(staying over two days) in another coun- 
try? What percentage of cases cannot be 
deterred because the country cannot'be 
classified as a safe country for that class of 
refugee claimant? 
The Alternative Use 
of Visas 
For some of the cases, even mild leg- 
islation acceptable to the refugee support 
community, was not required to deter 
such claimants. No legislation was 
required. Two of the countries to which 
refugee claimants belonged - Nicaragua, 
with refugee acceptance rates of 19 per- 
cent, and Honduras, with 26 percent - 
had no visa requirement at the time of the 
study. The imposition of a visa, which 
required no legislation, could have elimi- 
nated virtually all of these claims. The 
study itself provides the evidence. "The 
flow of Hondurans has decreased to a 
mere trickle after the imposition of a visa 
requirement in mid-September." (p. 10) 
Thus, to assess the efficaciousness of 
the legislation, all cases from Nicaragua 
and Honduras must be eliminated from 
the study. In the sample of 1440 cases rep- 
resenting over 2000 individuals who 
arrived in Canada between August 10 and 
September 27 of 1987,276 cases should be 
deducted since they could have been and 
were deterred by the imposition of visas. 
This leaves 1164 cases. 
Not all countries where the claimants 
could have claimed refugee status are 
"safe countries"; in the case of the U.S., 
there is a low acceptance rate for 
Guatemalans and ~a ivadoreans .  In 
Canada, Guatemalans have an acceptance 
rate of 70 percent and Salvadoreans an 
acceptance rate of 79 percent; in the US. 
the acceptance rates are less than 3 per- 
cent. Thus, Guatemalan and Salvadorean 
refugees transiting the United States can- 
not be returned to a "safe country", even 
though virtually all of these claimants 
arrive indirectly. (Salvadoreans - 95 pcr- 
cent; Guatemalans - 98 percent). 
Guatemalans and Salvadoreans constitute 
10 percent of the total in the sample. If 
eliminated from the targeted group (i.e., 
those to be returned to "safe countries"), 
the new system is left with 1027 of the 
1440 sample cases, 71 percent of the case 
load - not an inconsiderable number. 
In effect, the "safe country" provision 
is ineffective when applied to Central 
American refugees, either because the 
U.S. discriminates against them in the 
refugee claims procedure utilized in the 
United States or because such claimants 
could have been deterred by other means. 
Note, we included only Guatemala 
and ~1 Salvador in the  list of those to 
the legislation would be inapplica- 
ble because of the way the refugee claims 
p c e d u r e  operates in the United States. 
B U ~  as the study notes, "With the possible 
exception of Nicaragua and Iran, all of 
these countries produce RSAC acceptance 
rates which are substantially higher than 
=fugee acceptance rates in the United 
states." (p. 7, emphasis added) To be 
accurate we should not only eliminate 
~uatemala and El Salvador from the list, 
but also all refugee claimants who arrive 
from Lebanon (20), Ghana (21, Pakistan 
(g), Somalia (59) and Sri Lanka (40) who 
transit the United States. This would 
reduce the number of cases to which the 
legislation is applicable to 897 cases or 87 
percent of the targetable sample or 62 per- 
cent of the total cases. 
Applicable Cases - 
Documented and 
Sojourners 
Assume we do not reduce the appli- 
cable cases from 1027 to 897, we have the 
following scenario. In order to return 
potential refugee claimants to third coun- 
tries where they sojourned and might 
have made a claim, it is necessary to have 
"documentary evidence to prove status in 
such a third country." (p. 10) In this case 
only 526 were documented, 51 percent of 
the applicable sample or 37 percent of the 
total number of cases. Thus, on one 
ground of eligibility for return to a "safe 
country" - documentation proving a 
sojourn in that country - the real target 
would be reduced dramatically. 
But the applicable category of those 
eligible to return must not only have the 
documentation to prove they sojourned in 
a third country, they must have actually 
sojourned in the country. "A claimant 
who has sojourned in a third country is 
considered to have stayed more than two 
days and not been in transit through that 
country." (p. 5) "A person could not be 
returned to a third country where the 
stopover in that country was solely for the 
purpose of connecting to a flight from 
Canada." (p. 4) 
Unfortunately, the statistics do not 
provide a breakdown of those who were 
both inadequately documented for a 
return and who sopurned in a third coun- 
try. Assume that the documented group 
Are the targets of the new legislation manifestly 
unfounded claimants or claimants from refugee pro- 
ducing countries? 
"Seventy percent of the claims aren't genuine. These are 
people who just want to short cut the normal immigration 
procedures. 11 
Roger White, CEIC spokesman, Toronto Star, October 7,1988 
"The concept of safe return [the central device in the new 
legislation to deny claimants access to a hearing] is based on 
the principle that Canada is not the only country in the 
world which accords protection to refugee claimants." 
Refugee Determination Task Force of Employment and 
Immigration Canada, "Refugee Claimants: Analysis of 
Current Flows to Canada" (March 1988) 
The scholars in CEIC know who they want to deter 
even if a CEIC spokesman does not. 
was evenly distributed between those 
who came directly to Canada and those 
who sojourned in a third country (though 
it would seem that more of those who 
sojourned in a third country would arrive 
without documentation). Of the 1027 
cases in the applicable sample, 420 
sojourned in third countries. Of the 420 
cases, we assume 51 percent had the prop 
er documentation. That is, the "safe coun- 
try" legislation would be applicable to 214 
cases, or about 15 percent of the total 
cases. 
The sample we used included (for 
purposes of calculation) those who came 
via the United States. But, according to 
the study, the acceptance rates in the 
United States are substantially lower for 
all but the Iranians. In reality those who 
sojourned in the U.S. should be taken out 
of the total. That is, 28 of the 214 cascs 
should be deducted, leaving 186 cases or 
13 percent of the targeted 
Other Factors 
The draconian "safe country" return 
measure will be applicable to a maximum 
of 13 percent of the case load. Evcn this 
estimate is exaggerated. The total number 
of cases on which the study was done 
included all arrivals from countries pro- 
ducing refugt* claims, not just those who 
did file or intended to file a refugee claim. 
Further, the documented arrivals were 
distributed evenly between those who 
arrived in Canada directly and thosc who 
had sojourned in a third country, when, in 
all likelihood, the latter category had a 
higher percentage of undocumented 
arrivals. 
The total numbers of cases to which 
the safe return legislation will be applica- 
ble is unlikely to exceed 10 percent of 
refugee claimants. This does not take into 
consideration that the legislation itsclf is 
likely to increase those who arrive with- 
out documentary evidcnce to prove status 
in a third country. Nor does it takc into 
account the possibility that third countries 
may not re-admit claimants. 
In other words, the maximum of 10 
percent of the cases to which the "safe 
country" return mechanism is applicable, 
according to past patterns, will be further 
reduced; of that reduced target thcre is a 
strong likelihood that many of the refugee 
claimants will not be readmitted to thosc 
third countries. 
It appears that years of delayed Icgis- 
Refugee Claimants 
Table 2 
Total Documented Indirect Sojourned Protected Acceptance Rates 87/88 
Country Cases* % Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % % 
Hondurase* 228 16 224 98 138 61 33 14 0 0 
Nicaragua** 48 3 48 100 30 63 14 29 6 20 
El Salvador 84 6 55 65 80 95 78 93 4 5 
Guatemala 53 4 20 38 52 98 50 94 4 8 
Lebanon 83 6 78 94 45 54 15 18 1 2  
Ghana 142 10 70 49 109 77 23 16 12 11 
Pakistan 41 3 25 61 36 88 25 61 8 22 
Somalia 90 6 72 80 76 84 63 70 9 12 
Iran 265 18 50 19 244 92 125 47 22 9 
SriLanka 175 12 66 38 158 90 93 53 18 11 
Other 231 16 165 71 149 65 7 6 3 3  13 9 
* Visitor Visa not required 
** Note total cases include all applicants from refugee claimants producing countries, not just 
refugee claimants 
lation and the alienation of the refugee 
support community, the bulldozing of the 
opposition parties and the Senate, has 
resulted in legislation which will do very 
little to reduce the number of refugee 
claims. 
Alternatives 
One of the measures of efficacious- 
ness is whether a technique of reducing 
the number of claims is more effective 
than any alternative. We have tried to 
indicate that, at the very best, 10 percent 
of the claimants could be returned to a 
third country based on the "safe country" 
criterion. As it happens, the study's statis- 
tics indicate that 9 percent of the sample 
applied for or received refugee status or 
de facto protection in another country. 
Several years ago, in the prolonged series 
of meetings between representatives of 
refugee support groups, government offi- 
cials, members of parliament and govern- 
ment ministers, legislation acceptable to 
most parties would provide for the return 
of refugee applicants to countries where 
they had applied for or had received 
refugee status or de facto protection in that 
country (provided that country firmly 
protected the refugee). In other words, 
legislation acceptable to large numbers of 
people could have been introduced, prob- 
ably with unanimous consent, to accom- 
plish a reduction of refugee applicants, 
by passing legislation which provided for 
the ineligibility for refugee status in 
Canada for those who had applied for or 
received refugee status in another country, 
providing those claimants had a hearing to 
determine that the country protected 
refugees. Ir, other words, eliminating 
those who could have applied and guaran- 
teeing a hearing to all those who did 
apply or receive refugee status, would 
have eliminated the need for a twostage 
process that reintroduced complications, 
alienates the refugee support community, 
is subject to court chalienges and, which, 
probably won't be effective anyway. 
There is one other issue. Ghanaians 
constitute about 10 percent of the sample. 
Legislation could have been introduced to 
define and accelerate the processing of 
claims from refugee claim countries with 
very low success rates. This could have 
been another acceptable method of reduc- 
ing the number of refugee claims. In 
other words, alternative and far more 
acceptable legislation could have been 
introduced which would have effectively 
reduced the number of refugee claimants 
by double the amount that the "safe coun- 
try" provision is likely to achieve. 
Conclusion 
It appears that the "safe country" pro- 
vision is a mouse that roars. It will have 
little effect in reducing the number of 
applicants. Other more specific legisla- 
tion could have been introduced which 
would have been effective and more accu- 
rately targeted towards those abusing the 
system while ensuring a fair hearing for 
all claimants. Instead, time was lost. We 
now will have a system which will be 
costly to administer, which will affect very 
few applicants, and which will be chal- 
lenged in court in any case. In the pro- 
cess, the refugee support community, 
whose co-operation is so critical to the 
successful resettlement of refugees in 
Canada, has been alienated. 
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